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This paper derives a new effect of trade liberalisation on the quality of the environment.
We show that in the presence of heterogeneous firms the aggregate volume of emissions
is influenced not only by the long-established scale effect, but also by a reallocation effect
resulting from an increase in the relative size of more productive firms. We show how the
relative importance of these effects, and hence the overall effect of trade liberalisation on
the environment, is affected by the emission-intensity at the firm level: Aggregate emissions
decrease when trade is liberalised if and only if firm-specific emission intensity decreases
strongly with increasing firm productivity.
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The recent economic literature has come up with a very useful way to systematically analyse
the environmental effects of international trade. According to this now-standard classification,
the overall effect of trade liberalisation on aggregate emissions is decomposed into three partial
effects: a scale effect resulting from the trade-induced augmentation of economic activity, a
technique effect resulting from changed firm-level emission intensities due to endogenous changes
in environmental policies, and a composition effect resulting from a trade-induced change in
the factor allocation across sectors.1 In the theoretical framework predominantly used in this
literature, trade occurs due to international differences in relative factor endowments, but the
trade pattern may be reversed by differences in country-specific environmental regulation (the
pollution haven hypothesis).2
In this paper, we theoretically derive a new effect of trade liberalisation on the environ-
ment that complements the three effects analysed traditionally. For this purpose, we set up
a one-sector model of an open economy with monopolistic competition. Firms differ in their
productivity, as in Melitz (2003), and in addition they are heterogeneous with respect to their
environmental efficiency.3 Pollution is generated during the production process and exerts a
direct negative effect on welfare. In line with recent empirical evidence (Cole et al., 2005; Cole
1This classification has been introduced by Grossman and Krueger (1993) in an empirical paper, while a
model-based definition has been provided in a theoretical paper by Copeland and Taylor (1994).
2These mechanisms have been well studied empirically. Antweiler et al. (2001) simultaneously estimate the
scale, technique, and composition effects of free trade on the concentration of SO2 in more than 40 countries over
a time span of 25 years. Their findings suggest, on the one hand, a comparably small composition effect and on
the other hand the dominance of positive effects of trade liberalisation on environmental quality, notably driven
by the technique effect. Cole and Elliott (2003) derive similar results concerning the reduction of SO2 emissions,
but show that the effect of trade liberalisation may be less beneficial for the pollutants CO2 and NOx. Frankel and
Rose (2005) account for the potential endogeneity of income and trade volumes. In a recent survey, McAusland
(2010) concludes that trade liberalisation may lead to a reduction of local pollutants, whereas the overall impact
on global pollutants like greenhouse gases is rather augmenting.
3Monopolistic competition models have been somewhat neglected in the trade-and-environment literature.
Exceptions include Rauscher (1997), Gürtzgen and Rauscher (2000), Haupt (2000, 2006), and Pflüger (2001).
See also the monograph by Copeland and Taylor (2003), and the surveys by Sturm (2003), and more recently
Copeland (2011), who all include brief sections discussing models with monopolistic competition.
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and Elliott, 2008; Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2009), we assume that more productive firms are also
environmentally more efficient. In this setup, trade liberalisation – by benefitting more produc-
tive firms with a lower emission intensity disproportionally – affects average emission intensity
in the economy via a previously unmodelled reallocation effect.4
We show that the overall effect of trade liberalisation on emissions in our framework depends
on the relative strength of the traditional scale effect, which leads to an increase in aggregate
emissions, ceteris paribus, and the reallocation effect, which leads to a decrease in aggregate
emissions, ceteris paribus. The overall effect of freer trade is beneficial for the environment if
and only if firm-specific emission intensity decreases strongly with increasing firm productivity.
Although the traditional composition effect and the traditional technique effect are absent
from our analysis, the reallocation effect exhibits characteristics of both these traditional effects
and can be interpreted as an intra-sectoral version of the former and as an aggregate version
of the latter. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model setup. Section 3 derives the open economy equilibrium. The effects of trade liberalisation
on the economy and on environmental quality are analysed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model setup
2.1 Utility and Demand
We consider two economies i and j that are open to trade and produce varieties of a differentiated
final good, q. We will call i the Home country and j the Foreign country in the following.
Following Demidova and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2009), we assume that the Home country is a small
open economy, treating country-j variables parametrically. Either economy has a representative
4Melitz and Trefler (2012) also use this term to describe the rise in allocative intra-industry efficiency due to
trade. They do not refer to the impact of trade on the environment, though.
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consumer using all his income for consumption of the differentiated good. Preferences of a
representative consumer in country i are given by
Wi = Ui − ηEDi, (1)
where Ui denotes utility consuming a differentiated good, whereas ηEDi denotes disutility from
environmental damage. Parameter η > 0 reflects the preferences for environmental quality,












where qi(v) denotes demand for variety v in country i, Vi is the set of varieties that are avail-
able for consumption in i, and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the different
varieties of q in consumption. With Ri as the expenditure of the representative consumer, and
pi(v) as the domestic price of variety v, utility maximisation subject to the budget constraint
∫
v∈Vi





where Pi is the standard CES price index in country i.
Environmental damage in country i results from domestic and foreign emissions, and for
simplicity we specify the linear function
EDi = γEj + (1 − γ)Ei, (4)
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where Ei and Ej denote pollution in countries i and j, respectively. The analysis below will focus
on country i. Due to the small open economy assumption, pollution in j is a parameter from
country i’s point of view. Parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] is a measure for the degree of “transboundariness”
of a particular pollutant, where γ = 0 denotes the case of a purely local pollutant, and γ = 1
the case of a global one.
2.2 Production
There is a continuum of firms, each producing one unique variety. Homogeneous labour is the
only factor of production, the labour market is perfectly competitive, and the equilibrium wage
rate in country i is denoted by wi. The mass of domestic producers in country i is given by
Mdi and together with exporters M
x
j from country j (j 6= i) these firms add up to the mass of




j . Firm entry into each market is
described in section 3 below. The goods market in either country is characterised by monopolistic
competition, implying that firms take aggregate variables as given, while they set prices as a
monopolist in the market for their own variety. In order to produce and distribute their output,
firms have a (periodical) fixed cost wif . The output of each firm is linear in variable labour
input lvi and depends on the firm-specific productivity level ϕ: qi = ϕl
v
i . Denoting the marginal
cost of selling variety v in market i by ci(v), the solution to a firm’s price-setting problem is





where ρ ≡ (σ − 1)/σ. Unit costs of selling in market i are equal to unit production costs
c̃i(v) = wi/ϕ(v) for domestic varieties. Imported varieties are subject to an ad valorem tariff
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at rate τ , and therefore ci(v) ≡ (1 + τ)c̃j(v) for imported varieties. From (3) and (5), domestic
revenues and profits, respectively, of a country-i firm with productivity ϕ are given by











Comparing two arbitrary firms 1 and 2 based in country i, and using the relationship between
firm-level revenues, output, and employment just derived, it follows directly that relative do-
mestic outputs, revenues, and variable employment levels of these firms are proportional to their


















Exporting firms from country i have to bear a second fixed cost, wif
x, but variable trade costs
are zero. Country j is assumed to be large in the sense that country-i firms treat market size
A ≡ RjP
σ−1




and the export revenues and profits follow as










respectively. The comparison of Eqs. (6) and (9) shows that firm-level export revenues are
proportional to domestic revenues, and one can easily show that this proportionality also holds
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for output and variable employment levels. Hence, the results in Eq. (7) are also valid for the
ratio of two firms’ total outputs, revenues, and variable employment levels, provided these firms
have the same export status.
















− F x, (10)
respectively, where F x are country-j firms’ export costs. Note that τ enters the expression for
export revenues of country-j firms twice: First, it appears in the term in brackets since it affects
the domestic consumer price and the implied quantity demanded. The term in square brackets
then gives gross export revenues (including tariff payments), which have to be divided by 1 + τ
in order to give net export revenues.
2.3 Emissions
Pollution is emitted by each firm as a joint output of production. An individual firm with
















qi(ϕ) if firm does not export
[qi(ϕ) + qj(ϕ)] if firm exports
(11)
The emission intensity 1/ϕα is defined as the amount of pollution per unit of output, and as
parametrised in Eq. (11) it changes monotonically with firm-specific productivity ϕ, where the
extent to which this is the case depends on technology parameter α ≥ 0. The higher α, the
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stronger the decline in emission intensity in more productive firms.5 Formally, it follows from









There are some interesting special cases. In the borderline case of α = 0, emission intensity is
independent of firm productivity, and hence firm-specific emissions are directly proportional to
output. With α = 1, emissions are proportional to variable labour input. Since more productive
firms employ more workers (given the status as exporter or non-exporter, respectively), high-
productivity firms in this case still have higher total emissions than low-productivity firms. With
α = σ, the reduction in emission intensity in more productive firms is sufficiently strong to fully
compensate the higher output, and the total emissions per firm, given its status as exporter or
non-exporter, respectively, are independent of firm productivity.
3 Open economy equilibrium
Firm entry into domestic production and into exporting is modeled as is standard in Melitz-type
models: There is an unbounded pool of entrants deciding on paying a fixed market entry cost
wif
e, which is immediately sunk, that allows them to draw labour productivity from the common
distribution Gi(ϕ). Knowing their productivity, they then decide whether to start producing,
and which markets (only domestic, or domestic and foreign) to serve. Fixed export costs wif
x
ensure that only a subset of the domestic firms finds it profitable to export, and similarly due
to foreign export costs F x only a subset of foreign firms serves the domestic market. There is
5This is in line with recent empirical findings (cf. Cole et al., 2005; Cole and Elliott, 2008; Mazzanti and Zoboli,
2009) that suggest a positive correlation between productivity and environmental efficiency.
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an infinite number of time periods, and every period an exogenous fraction δ of firms is hit by
a negative shock and has to stop production. We focus on a steady-state equilibrium, in which
the mass of firms is constant over time.
Firm productivities ϕ are Pareto distributed, with the lower bound normalised to one without
loss of generality: Gi(ϕ) = 1 − ϕ
−k and g(ϕ) = kϕ−(k+1), where we assume that k > σ
holds in order to ensure that average per-firm output is finite.6 With the ex ante productivity
distribution being Pareto, also the ex post productivity distributions of active firms, µd(ϕ), and
of active exporting firms, µx(ϕ), are Pareto, with the respective lower bound being given by the

















Similarly, foreign exporting firms are Pareto distributed as well, with the productivity of the least
productive foreign exporter (domestic importer) denoted by ϕm. Using the Pareto distribution,







where π̄i are the average profits of all active firms, and (ϕ
d)−k is the ex-ante probability of a
successful draw. The left hand side gives the present value of expected profits from the point of
view of a firm that does not yet know its productivity, and in equilibrium this value has to be
equal to the cost of entering the productivity draw.
6A Pareto distribution of firm productivities is commonly used in the literature following Melitz (2003) (al-
though not in the original paper by Melitz). Eaton et al. (2011), among others, document that this distributional
assumption provides a good approximation for the right tail in the empirical distribution of firm sizes.
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3.1 Zero profit conditions and economy averages
There are three zero profit conditions, each giving a general equilibrium relationship between
the respective cutoff productivity (ϕd, ϕx, and ϕm), the fixed labour requirement of entering



































= F x, (17)
where we have used the definition of profits in Eqs. (6), (9), and (10). On the left hand side in
all three equations are the operating profits of the lowest-productivity firm serving the respective
market, and they are set equal to the fixed cost of serving this market.
The zero profit conditions can now be used to derive simple expressions for averages across
firms for key economic variables. First, average output for the domestic market and the export
























where we have substituted from Eqs. (6), (9), and (13).7 Using the link between firm-level
output and firm-level emissions given by Eq. (11), average per-firm emissions due to production
7The details of the derivation are deferred to the appendix.
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α + k − σ
)
fx(ϕx)α−1 (19)
Using the same procedure as in the derivation of Eq. (18), average domestic revenues and export
revenues, respectively, can be computed as




where we have defined Θ ≡ k/[k − (σ − 1)] > 1. Lastly, average profits for all firms in the
economy can be written, following Eq. (20), as:










where (ϕd/ϕx)k is the share of domestic firms that export.
3.2 Aggregate variables
In general equilibrium, domestic labour needs to be fully employed. Taking into account labour’s
potential employment in market entry, as well as in production for the domestic market and for
export, the full employment condition is written as
M ei f















µx(ϕ)dϕ = Li, (22)
where M ei is the mass of firms entering the productivity draw, and Li is the exogenous labour




of firms taking up production is equal to the mass of firms stopping production), the identity
Mxi = (ϕ
d/ϕx)kMdi , as well as Eqs. (14) to (16) and (20), it is possible to solve for the mass of










where Ωi ≡ ρLi/(kδf
e) is a measure of market size.






















and hence aggregate output is higher the lower the domestic cutoff productivity, and the lower
the foreign cutoff productivity, ceteris paribus.9













Aggregate domestic emissions are hence determined by the technical parameter α as well as by
the equilibrium levels of the domestic entry and the export cutoff productivities ϕd and ϕx.
8See the appendix for a detailed derivation.
9Aggregate output Qi as defined in Eq. (24) is not usually considered a variable of interest in Melitz-style trade
models with hetereogeneous firms, since welfare depends on the CES-aggregate of firm-specific outputs, rather
than on their simple sum. Qi is a relevant variable in the present context though, since in our framework a change
in Qi is the natural measure of the scale effect.
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3.3 Cutoff productivities
Having derived aggregate variables as a function of the various productivity cutoffs, we now
turn to determining the cutoffs themselves. To this end, we make use of the free entry condition









While not an explicit solution for either cutoff, Eq. (26) gives a link between the two productivity
cutoffs ϕx and ϕd that only depends on model parameters. It is immediate that a higher domestic
productivity cutoff is accompanied in equilibrium by a lower export productivity cutoff, with














A second link between the two cutoff productivities can be derived from the trade balance
condition, which states that the value of exports at world market prices (identical to the export
revenue of country-i firms) is equal to the value of imports at world market prices (identical
to the export revenue of country-j firms). Using Eq. (20), the trade balance condition can be
written as
Mxi wif
x = Mxj F
x. (28)




and some straightforward but tedious algebra, we get





where B is a positive constant. Eq. (29) links the two productivity cutoffs ϕd and ϕx to the
policy parameter τ , and we can use Eq. (26) to substitute for either cutoff productivity. We












2k−ρ − fxB−k(1 + τ)
−k2
(2k−ρ)ρ ≡ 0, (30)
linking domestic cutoff productivity ϕd and the import tariff τ .
4 Trade liberalisation
Trade liberalisation is modelled as the unilateral reduction of the domestic tariff τ . Implicit







and, as formally shown in the appendix, we have ∂ϕd/∂τ < 0.10 Hence, more liberal trade
increases the domestic cutoff productivity. The effect on the export cutoff productivity follows

















10See Demidova and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2009) for an alternative proof.
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and hence a higher degree of trade openness reduces the productivity level of the marginal
exporter. The intuition behind the effect of trade liberalisation on both domestic and export
cutoffs is straightforward (Demidova and Rodŕıguez-Clare, 2009): Consumer expenditure shifts
towards imported varieties, which leads to an exit of the least productive firms. The direct
effect of this exit is to increase the domestic productivity cutoff. But due to the labour released
by the exiting firms the equilibrium wage wi decreases, and the most productive non-exporting
firms become competitive on the export market, implying a decrease in the export productivity
cutoff.















The sign of the term in brackets ultimately decides on the overall impact on aggregate produc-
tion. We know from Eqs. (24) and (27) that the first term is negative, while the second term
is positive: On the one hand, trade liberalisation, by increasing the domestic cutoff produc-
tivity, has a negative impact on production for the domestic market. On the other hand, by
lowering the export cutoff productivity, it increases the output destined for the export market.

































and since ϕx > ϕd the term in brackets is positive, which implies that trade liberalisation
increases aggregate output.
Domestic environmental quality is determined by exogenous foreign emissions and domestic
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Hence, trade liberalisation increases domestic emissions if and only if the technology parameter
α is smaller than 1. We summarise our key result as follows:
Proposition. The effect of trade liberalisation on aggregate emissions is uniquely determined by
technology parameter α, governing the relative emission intensity of firms. Trade liberalisation
reduces aggregate emissions in a small open economy via a reallocation of resources to more
productive firms if and only if α > 1, and therefore emission intensities decrease strongly with
firm productivity.
The economic intuition for the effect of trade liberalisation on the environment is as follows.
Aggregate domestic emissions Ei are affected via two channels. First, a scale effect familiar from
Grossman and Krueger (1993) increases pollution in accordance with increased aggregate output.
Second, trade liberalisation leads to a reallocation of production towards more productive firms,
which produce with a lower firm-specific pollution intensity. This reallocation effect reduces
aggregate emissions, ceteris paribus. For α = 1, these two opposing effects exactly offset each
other, whereas for any value of α larger than 1, the reallocation effect dominates the scale effect,
and total domestic emissions are smaller in a more open economy.
An interesting case arises for the range of α between 1 and σ. On the one hand, the
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reallocation effect dominates the scale effect, and aggregate domestic emissions unambiguously
decrease. On the other hand, however, more productive firms generate more emissions, as can
be deduced from Eq. (12). This shows that freer trade can be favorable for the environment,
even if trade liberalisation leads to a reallocation of resources to those firms that – due to their
larger scale – generate more emissions. The scenario of 1 < α < σ well matches recent empirical
findings. It features an overall trade-induced reduction of pollution (Antweiler et al., 2001;
McAusland, 2010), and lower emissions of exporters relative to non-exporting competitors when
(crucially) controlling for output (Holladay, 2010).
It is instructive to relate the effect of trade liberalisation on emissions in the heterogeneous
firm framework to the effects derived in the traditional literature. Both the traditional technique
effect and the traditional composition effect are absent from our analysis: the first because we
abstract from environmental policy, and the second because our model has only a single sector.
However, our newly identified reallocation effect can be alternatively interpreted as either one
of these effects: Although the pollution intensity of an individual firm remains unchanged when
trade is liberalised, the average pollution intensity of the industry is reduced in accordance with
an increase in the average productivity. Or, put differently, the technique effect can be identified
for the aggregate sector. Alternatively, the reallocation effect can be interpreted as an intra-
sectoral composition effect. Trade leads to a change in the market structure within the analysed
sector. Labor is reallocated to the most productive firms, which are, under the assumption of
a positive relation between labour productivity and environmental efficiency, the firms with the
lowest emission intensities.11
11Copeland (2010, p. 209) informally describes an intra-sectoral version of the composition effect as follows:
”There are also firm-level effects: the recent international trade literature has emphasised that only the most
productive firms tend to export and so trade tends to cause some firms to expand and others to contract or exit.
[...] If emission intensities vary across industries [and] firms [...] then these composition effects will have a direct
influence on environmental outcomes.”
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Notably, the reallocation effect leads to a reduction of emissions in all trading countries,
ceteris paribus. In contrast, the traditional inter-sectoral composition effect has to be of opposite
sign between the trading countries since it relies on comparative advantage. By specializing in
the production of the pollution intensive good, one country has necessarily to bear an increase
in pollution due to the composition effect.
We finally turn briefly to a discussion of the effect that trade liberalisation has on welfare,
i.e. the utility of the representative consumer given by Eq. (1). Demidova and Rodŕıguez-Clare
(2009) have shown that the optimal tariff for the present small open economy setting, but
without emissions, is equal to τ o = ρ/(k − ρ) > 0, and in fact that this tariff leads to a first
best equilibrium. The optimal tariff in this case corrects the two distortions present in the
model, namely the mark-up distortion (consumer prices reflect the opportunity cost of imported
products in free trade, but they exceed the resource cost of domestic products by the monopolistic
markup) and the consumer surplus externality (higher import spending increases the mass of
available imported varieties, an effect ignored by the individual allocating his expenditure). Eqs.
(1) and (4) show that this result is modified in a straightforward way in the present context, in
which domestic production causes emissions. Whenever γ < 1, and therefore domestic emissions
cause non-negligible domestic environmental damage, the value for the optimal tariff deviates
from τ o = ρ/(k−ρ) in a well-defined way: Starting from τ o, small deviations have only a second-
order effect on the two non-environmental distortions (this is what makes the tariff optimal in
the setting of Demidova and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2009) to begin with), and hence the optimal
direction to deviate is the one that leads to lower domestic emissions. This – as shown above
– in turn depends on technology parameter α: a tariff increase reduces emissions for α < 1,
whereas a tariff reduction reduces emissions for α > 1. The optimal tariff is therefore smaller
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than τ o for the empirically plausible case α > 1, and larger than τ o otherwise.
5 Conclusion
The traditional literature derives three principal channels through which trade liberalisation
affects the environment: an emission increasing scale effect due to an augmentation of economic
activity, an emission reducing technique effect arising from changes in emission intensities, fol-
lowing stricter environmental policies, and a composition effect, whose sign and strength depends
on comparative advantages of the considered country. The latter effect is the consequence of a
change in a country’s industrial structure due to specialisation.
In this paper we have shown that by means of a trade model with monopolistic competition
and heterogeneous firms a fourth principal channel can be derived. By positively linking a firm’s
productivity to its environmental efficiency, the trade-induced increase in aggregate productivity
translates into a reduction of aggregate pollution intensity. The least productive firms exit the
market, resources are reallocated towards the most productive and least pollution intensive
firms. This reallocation effect reduces aggregate domestic emissions, ceteris paribus, but due to
the presence of the scale effect the overall impact of freer trade on total pollution is negative if
and only if firm-specific emission intensity decreases strongly with increasing firm productivity.
While in our model both, the traditional composition effect and the traditional technique effect
are absent, the reallocation effect can be interpreted as an intra-sectoral composition effect and
as a technique effect for the aggregate sector.
Since the model has only one sector and one factor of production, determinants of compar-
ative advantage and the resulting consequences on environmental quality cannot be addressed.
Hence, a potentially worthwhile extension would be to embed the present framework of a mo-
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nopolistically competitive sector with heterogeneous firms into a model of the Heckscher-Ohlin
type à la Bernard et al. (2007).
Appendix
Computing average output
Average domestic output q̄di can be calculated by means of the ex post productivity distribution
















































where the last equation follows from zero cutoff profit condition Eq. (15). Average output
produced for the export market can be calculated analogously, using zero cutoff profit condition
Eq. (16).
Mass of incumbent firms





and Mxi = (ϕ


































Now we can use average profits (21) to get
Mdi
[
























The last equation can easily be solved for the mass of incumbent firms Mdi . Applying the share
of exporters (ϕd/ϕx)k, then gives the mass of exporting firms Mxi .
Derivation of Eq. (29)











m(ϕ)dϕ ≡ Imp (A.7)
can be rewritten as Eq. (28) in the text by using average revenues given in Eq. (20). Recalling
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that Mxj = (ϕ






Rewriting the zero export cutoff profit condition Eq. (16) we can express the endogenous wage









The substitution of Eq. (A.9) into Eq. (A.8) leads to an expression for the import cutoff pro-

















Dividing Eq. (15) by Eq. (17), and substituting for wi from Eq. (A.9), we furthermore get













Using Eqs. (A.10) and (A.11), one can eliminate the import cutoff productivity ϕm, and gets






















Differentiation of Eq. (30)














































The strictly positive signs follow from the assumption that k > σ.
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